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The sociology of Islam and Muslim societies is 
“hot,” for all the wrong reasons. It is not because 
globalization has drawn the world closer together, 
or because sociology  is internationalizing its 
focus beyond its historical interest in Western 
Europe and North America. No, the sociology of 
Islam is “hot” because of the common but 
inaccurate association of Islam with terrorism and 
international conflict. The world wants to know 
why we are seeing such violence in the name of 
Islam, and sociologists -- along with other social 
s c i e n t i s t s - - a r e e x p e c t e d t o h a v e 
answers.Violence and stereotypes related to 
Muslims are, sadly, good for business in the 
sociology of Islam.
These days, many sociology departments now 
want experts on Islam -- job listings related to 
Muslim societies have increased significantly 
from a decade ago, when no department ever 
advertised a position in this area. Articles on 
Islam and Muslims are now appearing at a greater 
rate in sociology journals. The American 
Sociological Review, for instance, has run 
approximately six articles on Muslim societies in 
the past three years, compared with none in the 
nine years before that and only 19 in the previous 
38 years. The annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association now features at least one 
panel every year on the “Middle East  and Muslim 
Societies” -- a compromise rubric that bridges 
both the older area-studies tradition and newer 
cross-regional approaches to the study of Islam.
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We are a small band, those of us who study 
these subjects, but we are beginning to get 
organized. This newsletter is one of the 
mechanisms for our organization, along with the 
list-serve and the forthcoming website. I thank 
Tuğrul Keskin for his work in getting all of this 
set up and running! A related effort, designed to 
fit into the area-studies categories that so many 
universities and funding agencies use, is the 
Mideast Sociology  Working Group, whose 
i n fo rma t ion can be found a t h t t p : / /
www.unc.edu/~kurzman/MideastSociology. 
Both groups meet informally each year at  the 
annual meetings of the American Sociological 
Association and the Middle East Studies 
Association, where scholars can get to know 
each other and brainstorm collaborations. The 
next of these get-togethers is scheduled for the 
ASA meeting in San Francisco: Sunday, August 
9, 2009, at  12:15-1:45 p.m., including free lunch 
for graduate students (we plan to meet at the 
Hilton registration desk and move en masse to a 
local café).
As in any network of scholars, we cannot 
expect unanimity. Recent events in Iran, for 
example, have exposed sharp differences of 
opinion among sociologists who study Islam. 
Some have cheered the Green Movement, as 
the Iranian opposition now calls itself; within 
this group, some expressed optimism about the 
potential for political and social change in Iran, 
while others expressed pessimism and 
predicted tragedy. Other sociologists, by 
contrast, have expressed disdain toward the 
Iranian opposition, viewing it as meaningless 
middle-class agitation and a vehicle of Western 
imperialism. I have my own opinions on this 
subject (if you are interested, you can get a 
sense of them at  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
story/cms.php?story_id=5017). However, I 
would like to make a “meta-point” here about 
this disagreement. And that is: bring on the 
evidence!
Charles Kurzman is a professor of sociology at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
As sociologists, we have a special expertise in 
the collection and analysis of evidence on 
controversial social phenomena. Questions of 
race relations, economic stratification, gender 
processes, world systems, and the like are all 
subject for debate -- and these debates all 
involve the presentation and evaluation of 
evidence. This is not to say that theoretical 
insights are worthless, only that these insights 
grow with the development of empirical 
research. This research may be qualitative or 
quantitative, historical or contemporary, micro 
or macro, but it all adds to the substance of our 
debates.
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In the sociology of Islam, as in other areas of 
social science, we have a growing body of 
ev idence wi th which to engage our 
disagreements. There is survey evidence from 
numerous Muslim societies, for example -- the 
most prominent of these datasets is the World 
Values Survey, which can be analyzed online at 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org, but other 
datasets are also available from the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project, Demographic and Health 
Surveys,  and other sources. There is cross-
national macro data available from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database, various United Nations agencies, and 
the specialized datasets constructed by scholars 
in various fields. There is further information 
available on Islamic political parties, on hajj 
participation, on Islamic terrorism, and other 
subjects related to Islam. Of course, there is 
also a world of qualitative data -- single-case 
and comparative -- out there for researchers to 
explore. I am not siding with any  one form of 
data, all of which is open to skeptical scrutiny, 
in my opinion. However, I would like to see us 
continue to make use of all of this data as we 
express our disagreements.
One of the side-effects of being a “hot” field is 
that we are often asked about subjects we have 
not studied in depth. An “Islam expert” can get 
questions from students, colleagues, and 
journalists about anything from classical 
Islamic sources to contemporary Muslim 
attitudes. Wherever there is a news story  about 
Muslims, we are liable to get asked about it. 
None of us could possibly know everything 
about Islam and Muslim societies. I think it is 
worthwhile to pause for a moment, when we 
face one of these issues, and ask ourselves: 
What do we really know about this, and what 
evidence would we need to examine in order to 
offer an informed analysis? One service that 
our Sociology  of Islam network can provide is 
to link up  those of us asking these questions 
with those of us who have evidence.
Charles Kurzman 
June 25, 2009 / Chapel Hill, North Carolina
August 8-11, 2009 in San Francisco, CA for the 104th 
Annual Meeting of the American Sociological 
Association
THE MIDDLE EAST SOCIOLOGY WORKING 
GROUP INFORMAL GATHERING AT ASA
We are pleased to invite all of you, as members of the 
Middle East Sociology Working Group, to our semi-
annual informal gathering at the American 
Sociological Association meeting in San Francisco this 
August. 
The gathering is scheduled for 12:15-1:45 p.m. on 
Sunday, August 9, 2009, just after the Thematic 
Session, "Communities and Political Engagement in 
the Middle East." As is our custom, we will meet at the 
conference registration desk and wander somewhere 
for a bite. Graduate students' lunch is on the house!
An updated list of Middle East-related ASA panels is 
now available at our working group website, 
http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/MideastSociology.
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An Interview with Dr. Y. Tzvi Langermann on 
Islamic Studies and Islam in Israel 
By Tugrul Keskin and Najm al-Din Yousefi
Tzvi Langermann 
was born in Lowell, 
Massachusetts. He 
received his degrees 
from Boston and 
H a r v a r d 
U n i v e r s i t i e s . D r. 
L a n g e r m a n n h a s 
p u b l i s h e d 
e x t e n s i v e l y o n 
S c i e n c e a n d 
Philosophy in Medieval Jewish and Islamic 
Cultures, Islamic Astronomy, Jews in Medieval 
Islam, and Jews in Yemen. He also teaches “the 
Thought of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi” and “Greek 
Wisdom in Islamic Civilization.” He is married to 
Dina Zilberman, an organizational psychologist; 
and is the father of Netanel, Michal, and Amos, all 
three children born a few minutes apart  from each 
other in 2000. Dr. Langermann is the chair of 
Arabic Studies at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 
Israel. For more information about Dr. 
Langermann’s recent work, please visit his 
website: 
http://www.biu.ac.il/faculty/ytlangermann/ 
Tugrul Keskin and Najm al-Din Yousefi: Dr. 
Langermann, thank you for accepting this 
interview with the Sociology of Islam and 
Muslim Societies newsletter. First of all, would 
you please tell us about yourself and your 
research and how you developed your interest in 
Islamic Studies? 
Dr. Tzvi Langermann: Well, I learned Arabic 
because of my interest in the history of science; 
however, I became increasingly  interested in the 
interface between science, philosophy and 
religious thought in the medieval period, and this 
led me to explore Islamic thought. When I took up 
the job at Bar Ilan, I was asked to teach Qur'an, 
and that really motivated me; it quickly became 
not just  a teaching assignment, but  a very serious 
interest.
Keskin and Yousefi: Would you please tell us 
why you decided to move to Israel and why you 
are interested in studying Islam? 
Dr. Langermann: I moved to Israel out of a 
sincere feeling that I am returning to my 
ancestral homeland. I also want to live in a place 
where Jewish customs are integrated into the 
rhythm of life, so that I don't have to constantly 
make special arrangements in order to observe 
the Sabbath and holidays, as I had to do in the 
States. Finally, I also wanted to live in a place 
with some "oriental" ambiance.
I study Islam for a number of reasons, personal 
and professional. I began to study Islam by way 
of my studies in the history of science, which 
led me to learn Arabic, and which in turn 
opened up  new worlds for me (as learning a new 
language always does); my studies on Muslim 
scientists, some of whom (e.g. Ibn Sina) were 
major religious thinkers, as well as Jewish 
writers who drew upon Muslim writings, led me 
to study Islam more deeply. But I must also 
confess that, for whatever reason or reasons, I 
have never looked upon Islam as something 
totally alien.
Keskin and Yousefi: Given the vibrant 
intellectual exchange between Jewish and
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Islamic cultures, what do you make of the 
modern-era tension between the two cultures 
that have culminated in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict? Are the ongoing conflicts likely  to 
have a negative impact on studies of Islamic 
culture and history in Israel? 
Dr. Langermann: The study of Islamic 
cultures and history developed in Israel in the 
course of the ongoing and unending conflicts.
I would only add this: in the USA and (maybe 
less so) in Europe, Islam is a new thing, at least 
in the public sphere, and for that reason many 
people are interested in learning about it, so the 
opportunities are growing. In Israel that is not 
the case. Unfortunately  we are suffering now 
due to the general neglect of the humanities; 
perhaps I should say envaluation of or even 
scorn for the humanities. It  is that attitude, 
rather than any negative feelings coming out of 
the conflicts, that is already having a negative 
impact.
Keskin and Yousefi: Would you please give us 
a brief overview of Islamic Studies in Israeli 
universities? How many Islamic Studies centers 
are there in Israel, and what  are they  like? Do 
you think that there is enough independent 
academic research in Islamic Studies and Islam 
within Israeli Universities? 
Dr. Langermann: There are no centers that I 
know of, nor even departments, that are devoted 
to Islamic studies. Our department is simply 
called "Arabic". Some people look upon us 
simply  as the university's Berlitz, and I work 
hard to let them know that we are strong in our 
offerings in Islamic thought, as well as the 
Judaeo-Arabic Cultural Heritage and, of course, 
Arabic language and literature. I know that 
experts in Islam in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv also 
teach in departments of Arabic. There are also 
departments and centers devoted to Middle 
Eastern Studies. It's hard to say if there is 
"enough" research. Can one say  if it is enough 
to meet the demand, the way one can judge 
whether there are enough Toyotas? Obviously 
we would like to have more resources at our 
disposal. But I really should return to a point 
made earlier. What we really would like to see is 
a higher appreciation of the humanities—
Islamic studies, yes, but also literature of all 
sorts, and history. In Israel's formative years, 
under far more difficult economic and other 
circumstances, the leadership did appreciate the 
humanities; they  realized that that's what it's all 
about, that's why we sweat and bleed to build a 
country. 
Keskin and Yousefi: In your research you 
have dealt with Jewish philosophers such as 
Maimonides who flourished in the cultural 
milieu of medieval Islam. In light of your 
research, how do you assess the general 
attitude of Islamic civilization towards the 
Jewish contribution? 
Dr. Langermann: Overall, Islamic thinkers 
were receptive to Jewish contributions to 
medicine and the other sciences, but displayed 
very little interest in Jewish writings on 
theology and philosophy; but one should 
remember, that Jewish writers did not publish 
religious writings—that means, in the medieval 
period, deliberately initiate diffusion—the way 
they  did in the sciences. Islamic writers tended 
to view contributions to the sciences as 
individual—that is, the contribution of an Isaac 
Israeli, or, for that matter a Majusi, Masihi, or 
Ibn Rushd—rather than the contribution of a 
religious or ethnic group.
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Keskin and Yousefi: Do you think that the 
general attitude of Islamic civilization toward 
the Jewish contribution has varied significantly 
in different time-periods and localities? 
Dr. Langermann: Again, we must  speak more 
of the receptivity towards the work of Jews, 
rather than the "Jewish contribution". From the 
Islamic point of view, the Jewish contribution to 
civilization, if it can be called that, certainly 
ended with the Prophet, if not before. However, 
the contribution of Jews as individuals was 
acknowledged, as you say, in different degrees 
depending on the locale and time-period.
Keskin and Yousefi: How have Islamic 
traditions in theology, philosophy and science 
shaped medieval Jewish thought? 
Dr. Langermann: Enormously. Basically, Jews 
living in Islamic lands participated in the same 
enterprise, the same discourse, as Muslim 
thinkers and scientists did. The key point is an 
uncompromising insistence upon tawhid. 
Knowing just what tawhid means, and the 
related (Maimonides would say the identical) 
task of avoiding tajsim, requires a lifetime of 
study and reflection. One is constantly  engaged 
in a process of purifying one’s thoughts about 
the divine.
Keskin and Yousefi: It  is curious that, 
historically speaking, many Jewish scholars 
have taken a keen interest in studying various 
aspects of Islamic civilization, whereas very few 
Muslim scholars have actively engaged in the 
examination of Jewish theological and 
philosophical thought. How could we make 
sense of this asymmetrical interest? 
Dr. Langermann: I think that in large measure 
this is due to the absence of any real tradition of 
the humanities in Islamic cultures; I mean, the 
evaluation of the study of other cultures, their 
language, history, religions, arts, and so forth as 
a worthwhile and valuable field of knowledge in 
its own right. A work like al-Biruni's book on 
India stands out, not only  because of its 
wonderful observations and insights, but also 
because of the rarity of books of that sort.
Keskin and Yousefi: Do you think that Israeli 
scholars, who work on Islamic Studies and 
Islam, have any prejudice against Islam, or hold 
Islamophobic attitudes? 
  
Dr. Langermann: I am sure that some do. Don't 
forget that  Israel, like Turkey, has been ruled for 
the most part by  avowed secularists; some have 
a fanatical revulsion towards all religions.
Keskin and Yousefi: Dr. Langermann, we 
would like to ask you a question that is not 
directly  related with academia, but I think it is 
important to elaborate on and understand the 
problem that Jewish people have faced over 
centuries in Europe. As a Muslim, over the last 
thirty years, I think Muslims in general have 
sometimes been accused of using anti-Semitic 
overtones in their language when they  criticize 
Israeli foreign policies. However, I personally 
believe that we must not mix two different 
concepts; criticizing the Israeli Foreign Policy, 
and racism/anti-Semitism. As a Jew, what is 
your definition of racism/anti-Semitism, and 
where do you think that Muslims should draw 
the line between these two completely  different 
concepts? Do you think anti-Semitism exists in 
Muslim populated societies the same way it 
exists in Europe and America?
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Dr. Langermann: Well, that's a tall order. 
Generally, I think there is a big difference 
between speaking about, or criticizing, or 
lambasting, "the Israelis" and doing the same to 
"the Jews"; that's the main difference. Don't forget 
that powerful elements in Israeli society  and 
politics reject the idea of a "Jewish state". I also 
don't know exactly  how to measure anti-
Semitism. I'm sure that if you polled some groups 
of Muslims about their perceptions of Jews, you 
would find a lot of negativity (that's an 
Americanism, I'm not sure if it's in the dictionary). 
However, just how all of this comes into play in 
the public sphere is, at least I imagine it to be, a 
different question, and certainly the more pressing 
issue. I do want to end by saying that I've had a 
wonderful experience teaching classes on Qura'n, 
Sufism, and religious philosophy to classes where 
Muslims range between one-third to two-thirds of 
the participants; and I'm pleased that on the 
whole, my Muslim students realize that I am a 
believer, a muwahhid, and at least  aim towards 
ibada; and that means that we have in common the 
most important beliefs. We all belong to ma'shar 
al-muwahhidin. 
Call for Papers: 
Special Issue of the Sociology of Islam and Muslim 
Societies Newsletter
Contemporary Iran: Politics, Society and Economy
The next issue will be published at the beginning of 
October and we would like to publish your short articles, 
and abstracts of your dissertation or research, and a book 
review on Iranian politics, society and economy. 
Those who would like to contribute can send us their 
short articles or book reviews(1500-2000 words) by 
October 1st. 
Please send your submission to: 
Najm al-Din Yousefi: nyousefi@vt.edu 
and
Tugrul Keskin: tugrulk@pdx.edu  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On a recent holiday to Bali, I moved amongst the 
island’s population wearing my customary cotton 
headscarf and loose, long-sleeved dress I had 
adopted upon my conversion to Islam over a 
decade before. Seeing a white Australian Muslim 
woman evoked surprised reactions from locals 
and for those bold enough to ask questions, 
repeated explanations about my Muslim identity. 
The only  marker of difference that distinguished 
me from the hundreds of other Australian visitors 
was my Islamic dress; had I not been wearing a 
headscarf, I would have attracted little attention 
outside the normal tourist experience. As a white 
woman wearing Islamic dress, I carried with me 
all the contradictory symbols and meanings of 
Islamic female dress, referred to colloquially  as 
ḥijāb. As Franks (2000, 918) argues: “the power 
relations with which it is associated are situated 
not only  in the meaning with which it is invested 
but also in the circumstances under which it is 
worn.”  As well, women wearing Islamic female 
dress (however interpreted) are performing a 
religious act, even if it has other cultural, 
sociological and political implications. Thus, the 
question of who has the right and authority  to 
interpret religious dress is part of a wider debate 
over religious authority generally, where women’s 
bodies have become the contested battle-ground 
for Islamic authenticity  and identity (Yeğenoğlu 
1998, 99; Werbner 2007, 162; Mir-Hosseini 2007, 
90–91).  Based on a simplified version of 
Abdullah Saeed’s (2007) taxonomy this article 
looks at the discourse surrounding ḥijāb offered 
in four basic orientations:  traditionalist, 
secularist, fundamentalist, and contextualist.
Traditionalists
 
For those who we might call traditionalists (or 
perhaps better neo-traditionalists given the 
ubiquitous nature of modernity) and who follow 
traditional jurisprudence as it  developed over the 
course of many centuries from around the second/
third century AH, face-veiling for women is 
considered not only  permissible, but in some 
opinions compulsory  in public. In the pre-Islamic 
period, free women (and occasionally  free men) 
veiled their faces as a signal of their status 
(Stillman 2003, 20–21). This was carried into the 
Islamic era, and a mutually  reinforcing spiral was 
generated between the sartorial customs of early 
Muslim cultures and the opinions of religious 
lawyers generating interpretations of sacred law. 
Examples of the prerequisite of face-veiling for 
women include opinions related in the Ḥanafī fiqh 
text Heavenly Ornaments (Thanwi 2004, 328) and 
the Shāfi‘ī Reliance of the Traveller (Keller 1999, 
512) both of which have been translated into 
English in recent times. Nevertheless, important 
classical jurists who gave opinions permitting the 
face, hands and/or feet to remain exposed include 
Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Ṭabārī. For today’s 
traditionalists, body and/or face veiling are 
authentic Islamic practices because they accept as 
authoritative Islamic female dress as it was 
conceived in classical jurisprudence. 
Secularists 
For secularists, female veiling practices are 
associated with backwardness, misogyny, and the 
undesirable imposition of patriarchal religion 
intruding in public life. With contradictory 
arguments, secularists have asserted the ḥijāb 
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represents both the passive oppression of women 
as victims, and the aggressive assertion of 
religion in the public sphere (Werbner 2007; 
Scott 2005), whilst  denying any other symbols or 
meanings for Muslim female dress.  Western-
educated sociologist Fatema Mernissi views the 
ḥijāb as a cloth prison imposed to remove 
women’s agency  and voice: “veils hide only what 
is obscene” (Mernissi 1993, 179). She argues the 
imposition of ḥijāb—the moment in Prophetic 
history where the apartments of the wives were 
veiled by a curtain that  spelled their privatisation
— m a r k e d a r e t r e a t  f r o m a n o r i g i n a l 
egalitarianism taught by the Prophet, who was 
forced to compromise by  the overpowering 
patriarchy  of the community (Mernissi 1991, 
106–14, 178–79, 185). Mernissi spends a great 
deal of time attempting to present the ḥijāb—
conflated to mean both the privatisation of the 
Prophet’s wives and Muslim women’s dress—as 
inauthentic to the Prophet’s true message.
 
Fundamentalists 
Fundamentalists claim to resurrect the original 
teachings of Islam that have been neglected or 
masked by incorporation of un-Islamic 
innovations. They do this through a pragmatic, 
selective retrieval of past doctrines (Marty and 
Appleby 1993, 3). The discourse about Islamic 
female dress is one of the most important 
symbols and boundary markers of Muslim 
identity  for fundamentalists. The ḥijāb in their 
discourse is removed from any notion of cultural 
traditional Islamic dress, and fundamentalists 
have sought to elucidate an objective singular 
truth on what ḥijāb means for all Muslim women, 
everywhere. Although proposing a definitive 
interpretation, in practice fundamentalists differ 
on what they define as proper ḥijāb. Some 
(mostly  those of the Wahhābī-Salafī persuasion) 
require that for the woman, the entire body be 
covered with an opaque, loose, flowing outer 
cloak or wrap  that starts from the head. The face 
must be covered, either with this garment, or with 
a separate piece of affixed material, often referred 
to colloquially  as niqāb “mask, face-veil” (Al-
Munajjid 1997–2008). Other fundamentalists 
(such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Jamā‘a 
al-Islāmiyah) give permission for Muslim women 
to leave the face and hands uncovered, but 
require loose, opaque clothing that covers the 
body, usually  some sort of coat or dress, coupled 
with a headscarf pinned or tied so that it that 
covers the ears and neck, draping down onto the 
shoulders and/or chest. This is a new type of 
Islamic dress, referred to by fundamentalists as 
al-ziyy al-Islāmī “Islamic attire” or al-ziyy al-
shar‘ī (sharī‘ah attire) (El Guindi 1999, 134; 
Stillman 2003, 158).  
Contextualists 
Contextualists are Muslims who argue that Islam
—and in particular religious law—must be 
understood contextually (Esack 2005, 142–44). 
That is, Muslims have always interpreted religion 
through the paradigmatic lense of particular time-
periods, places, cultures, language-groups and 
classes. Because of this, Muslims developed rich 
and varied interpretations of Islamic belief and 
practice, unified around the core doctrines of 
monotheism and the prophethood of Muhammad. 
They assert  the right to perform ijtihād. 
Contextualists come from the modernist school of 
thought that arose in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (for example see Fazlur 
Rahman’s methodology for interpreting Islam in 
Rahman 1982, 2–11; Sonn 1991, 213–14; Saeed 
2006a, 42–43). 
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Contextualists vary as to their interpretations of 
Islamic dress, but generally speaking they 
approach the question by emphasising that a) 
Islam teaches modesty for men and women, and 
b) individuals and societies may have different 
interpretations of what  constitutes modesty. 
(Women Living Under Muslim Laws 1997, 201–
226). “The law of modesty in the Qurʼan applies 
to men and women both and applies to them 
equally. … You have to interpret the Islamic law 
of modesty, a) according to your own conscience 
and b) according to your cultural context. What is 
modest in one society is not modest in another 
society and so on” (215).  
Conclusion 
Different types of Muslims provide different 
answers to the question of what constitutes 
appropriate Islamic dress, because they  have 
different ways of approaching the interpretation of 
religion. Traditionalists acknowledge as their 
source of authority, the received interpretations 
and rulings of religious law that developed over 
many centuries. Secularists promote Western-style 
models of the separation of religion and state and 
the privatisation of religion.  Fundamentalists’ 
source of authority  lies in the search for a 
singular, definitive interpretation of God’s will. 
Lastly, contextualists assert the right  of 
individuals (including women) to interpret 
religion as appropriate for particular times, 
cultures and contexts. 
Rachel Woodlock, Researcher and Doctoral Candidate at Centre 
for Islam and the Modern World and the Global Terrorism 
Research Centre Monash University, Caulfield Ph: +61399034304 
Fax: +61399034686 Email: Rachel.Woodlock@arts.monash.edu.au
I use the label fundamentalist with some caution, as it is a hotly 
contested term. In this paper, it is used in the sense given in The 
Fundamentalism Project (Marty and Appleby 1991). 
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Representation of Islam and Muslims by the 
British Government Between 2001 and 2007 
By Leon Moosavi
Introduction
A great suspicion of Islam and Muslims in social 
and political discussions has led to recognition 
that Islamophobia is widespread in Britain 
(Abbas 2006: xv, The Runnymede Trust 1997). 
Perhaps the major concern about Islamophobia is 
that it is “prevalent in all sections of our society” 
and “part of the fabric of everyday life in modern 
Britain”  (The Runnymede Trust 1997: 1, 11). 
This extends to the political elite, as it has been 
noted that “Islamophobia reaches all the way up 
to the highest levels of government”  (Cesari 
2004b: 41). In the same breath, it has been 
argued that the ‘War on Terror’ and other 
Governmental responses to 9/11 and 7/7 have 
increased the acceptability of Islamophobia 
(Allen & Nielsen 2002: 53). This article – which 
is based on my MA dissertation – is concerned 
with the ways in which Muslims and Islam have 
been conveyed in speeches by British Cabinet 
Ministers of the Labour Government as one of 
the various ways in which Islamophobia 
crystallises. 
It is important to challenge those representations 
which are considered to be contradictory, 
stereotypical or inaccurate as these 
representations can be accepted as ‘truths’, 
leading to real life effects in the form of 
discrimination. Prejudices are generally assumed 
to be confined to those with less education and 
less ‘cultural capital’ than those in the highest 
echelon of society. Indeed, one commentator has 
described how “subtle forms [of Islamophobia] 
amongst the educated and well-placed elite are 
well-entrenched and proportionately more 
dangerous. …[as] the elite formulates and 
disseminates racism to the grassroots, where it 
becomes more explicit and violent”  (Malik 
2004b: 9). Aside from their influence on policy 
and legislation, ministers are extremely 
influential within the media and setting the 
agenda of national debates. In total, 111 speeches 
from 16 different Cabinet Ministers between 
2001 and 2007 were analysed. Due to limited 
space, I will only briefly share two themes that 
were explored in the dissertation.
‘The True Muslims’ and ‘The Real Islam’

The Government considers itself to have 
authority in intervening with theological matters 
by claiming who is a ‘true Muslim’ and what the 
‘real Islam’ is. There was often distinctions made 
between different types of Muslims. The ‘good 
Muslims’ were often described as the 
“moderate”  ones. For instance, Gordon Brown 
called for “partnership with moderate Muslims 
and moderates everywhere”  (Brown 2006b). 
This moderate Islam is supposedly characterised 
by being peaceful, non-violent, tolerant, 
respectful and loving. So for example, Tony 
Blair claimed, “The doctrine and teachings of 
Islam are those of peace and harmony. … It is a 
whole teaching dedicated to building peace in 
the world” (Blair 2001b).
One manifestation of promoting this 
‘secularised’ Islam is that it is intended to be 
more personal and practiced behind closed doors 
to the extent where any Muslim who allows their 
Islamic beliefs to influence their political activity 
in the public sphere is considered extreme 
(Malik 2004b: 13-14). This was emphasised in 
the ministers’ speeches by the constant reference 
directly to Islam as a “faith”  which holds 
connotations of personal belief rather than as a 
‘way of life’ which is how Islam is typically 
defined by Muslims themselves.  
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It is hypothesised by some that these 
constructions of Islam are to serve political 
purposes, mainly in making Islam more passive 
by weakening the ideological resistance that 
Islamic sources can accommodate for through 
emphasising Islam’s spiritual dimension and 
reducing its political and social dimensions 
(Ameli et al. 2007: 24). It has been argued that 
the brand of Islam that most matches the 
Government’s requirements is Sufism which is 
often presented as the most secularised and 
passive form of Islam (Cesari 2004b: 50-51,). 
Ruth Kelly expressed the Government’s desire 
to work specifically with Sufis by saying “[w]e 
need to always ask ourselves whether we are 
working with the right groups in the right 
way.  Organisations such as the Sufi Muslim 
Council are an important part of that 
work”  (Kelly 2006b). So for example, when 
the Muslim Council of Britain criticised the 
‘War on Terror’ “[t]he State looked instead to 
the Sufi Muslim Council as a replacement, not 
because it represented the majority sect among 
British Muslims, but because it was perceived 
as supportive of the government’s foreign 
policy” (Kundnani 2007: 182).
Following the line of identifying ‘the real 
Muslims’ and ‘the true Islam’, those who 
committed terrorism or were considered 
extreme were said to be abusing Islam and 
twisting its ‘real’ teachings. For example, Blair 
said that “the extremists that threaten violence 
are not true Muslims in the sense of being true 
to the proper teaching of Islam”  (Blair 2006i). 
Therefore, it is clear that the discourse does not 
reject Muslims and Islam per se, but specific 
variations of them. That some Muslims are 
worth accommodating is justified in the 
repeated argument that Muslims have 
contributed a great deal to British society.
Ministers even went as far to say that they 
wanted to unite with and empower ‘moderate’ 
Muslims to outcast and isolate those non-
conformist Muslims they consider extreme 
(Blair 2001b, Blears 2006), For example, 
Brown said “we must take steps to isolate 
extremists from the moderate 
majority”  (Brown 2006b), and despite saying 
“extremists are explicitly and continuously 
trying to divide and rule, to drive wedges 
between nations and between 
peoples”  (Beckett 2006), Margaret Beckett still 
pushes to “mobilise the vast moderate, majority 
and push the extremists to the fringe where 
they belong” (Beckett 2006). 
The Government does not hide the fact that it is 
engaged in promoting specific types of Islam. 
There is often talk about how it is funding and 
working with specifically hand-picked Muslim 
scholars and Muslims organisations to promote 
a certain version of Islam as well as 
encouraging mosques to engage in certain 
activities and giving specific syallabi to Islamic 
schools for them to teach (Blair 2004c,Blears 
2006). For example, Blair has admitted that 
“one of the things that we are looking at is how 
you make sure that there is a certain set of 
agreed rules and guidelines as to how any faith 
school should teach its own faith”  (Blair 
2005e) and elsewhere confessed that he has 
used certain Muslims to promote a specific 
version of Islam (Blair 2006c).

The idea that there is a ‘real Islam’ is not only 
promulgated by the Government though. In 
fact, there is increasing debates amongst 
Muslims themselves about who has the right to 
call themselves a Muslim and what the true 
Islamic teachings are. Therefore, it has to be 
accepted that Muslims do – and always will – 
interpret their religion in a multitude of 
ways .  





The constructions of one ‘true Islam’ is based on 
one general assumption, which is that Muslims 
can be categorised into one uniform group. 
Indeed, one prominent stereotype of Islam and 
Muslims is that they are static and monolithic, 
unable to change, evolve or accommodate 
diversity (Bayart 2005: 242-243, Kalin 2004: 
143, 166). This stereotype of Muslims as 
monolithic has been rejected by many who have 
commented on the huge diversity of Muslims 
around the world, including within Britain. 
Muslims are individuals with unique 
characteristics and identities, and therefore to 
attribute them to be part of one monolithic 
community just because they are Muslim limits 
them as individuals. 

There was a conscious effort by Government 
Ministers to abandon any construction of 
Muslims as monolithic which is clearly evident 
in comments such as by Tony Blair who said, 
“Islam is not a monolithic faith, but one made 
up of a rich pattern of diversity”  (Blair 2007b) 
or by Jack Straw who said  “Geographically, 
Islam is spread across the six continents – and it 
is equally diverse theologically, socially and 
politically”  (Straw 2005f) In some cases an 
effort was made to recognise there is not one 
Muslim community, but in fact “Muslim 
communities”  in the plural (Beckett 2006, Blair 
2001c). Such statements, nonetheless, restrict 
Muslims into smaller segmented communities 
assuming they all embody a certain feature. 
Conclusion

The seminal report that introduced the severity 
of Islamophobia in Britain explained that “[t]he 
UK Government’s official stance [towards 
Muslims] is one of welcome and inclusion. …It 
is a fine aspiration. The reality however 
frequently falls short”  (The Runnymede Trust 
1997: 1). The analysis in this paper agrees with 
this conclusion. Islamophobia based on 
assumptions, stereotypes and inferences were 
commonly identified. The negative 
representations of Muslims and Islam can lead 
to Muslims experiencing prejudice and 
discrimination in their everyday lives. Thus, 
these Islamophobic representations 
demonstrated by the Ministers - many of whom 
continue to hold positions in Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown’s cabinet - must be challenged. 
Finally, this discussion can be aptly summarised 
by a quote from the former Prime Minister of 
Britain, Tony Blair, who recently recognised 
that “there is huge and profound ignorance 
about Islam” (Blair 2007b).
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Scholarly Research in the Madrassa: A Brief 
Overview 
By Maulana Waris Mazhari 
(Translated by Yoginder Sikand)
Some days ago, I had the chance to meet a 
leading Islamic scholar, an author of several 
books. During our conversation he remarked 
that the biggest and most influential Madrassa 
in India had, in the last thirty years or so, 
produced only two well-researched books. This, 
he said, was evidence of the pathetic state of 
scholarship  characteristic of the vast majority  of 
the Indian Madrassa today. 
While in the past our Madrassa produced 
numerous scholars, today  this is hardly the case 
at all. Today, most Madrassa restrict themselves 
only to the teaching of what is specified in their 
curriculum. In most cases, the only extra-
curricular activity that they provide for their 
students is training them to deliver emotion-
driven speeches. Not surprisingly, then, almost 
all Madrassa graduates become either teachers 
or orators. Some of them earn their bread by 
penning tracts, whose only purpose is to foment 
sectarian strife. Very few Madrassa graduates 
actually go on to do any serious scholarly 
research at all. Shockingly, even those men who 
spend years teaching voluminous tomes on 
Hadith, Fiqh and Qur’anic commentary for 
years on end in the Madrassa often only  pen a 
few tracts of a very elementary sort or a 
commentary on some basic text book and 
consider this to be a great scholarly 
contribution! And their sycophantic students 
and other followers are ever ready to convince 
them of the supposed great intellectual 
contributions that they have made thereby! 
It is an undeniable fact that expansion of the 
frontiers of knowledge, even with regard to 
religion, is now no longer happening in the 
Madrassa. If at all this is happening, it is outside 
the Madrassas—in institutes, universities and 
private intellectual circles. This is so not just  in 
India alone but throughout the rest of South 
Asia. The intellectual stagnation in our 
Madrassas can be exemplified with the help of a 
single instance. Almost all the Sunni ulema 
groups in South Asia claim to be heirs of the 
intellectual legacy of Shah Waliullah Dehlavi, 
the influential eighteenth century Indian scholar, 
but besides his Hujjat al-Balagha, no other of 
his many works is taught in the Madrassas or 
has been published by them. And today 
conferences about Shah Waliullah and his 
legacy are being held at universities in Delhi 
and Aligarh, not in the Madrassas in Deoband 
and Lucknow. 
Interesting and new, well-researched scholarly 
Islamic texts are being produced by some 
Muslim academies in Delhi. But nothing of this 
sort comes out of the hundreds of publishing 
houses associated with Madrassas across the 
country. Scores of journals and magazines are 
published by Madrassas throughout India, but 
most of these are of a very poor standard in 
terms of intellectual output. They lack 
originality, focus on hypothetical and theoretical 
issues as against practical realities, are overly 
preachy and normative and very  often are 
geared to fanning sectarian conflicts and hatred. 
The main reason for this pathetic state of affairs 
is, undoubtedly, the narrow mindedness of the 
majority  of our ulema and Madrassa students. 
This is related to the fact that they have 
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restricted the work of Madrassas to what they 
see as guiding people on issues of day-to-day 
concern in matters of ritual, practice and belief 
and the preservation of what is generally 
considered to be ‘Islamic’ culture. In this way 
have cut themselves off from the wider world. 
But, the question arises, what is the need for 
students to spend eight  long years, studying 
numerous different subjects, if this is what the 
Madrassas are training them for? A course of a 
much shorter duration, of say three years or so, 
would suffice for this purpose. 
Another factor for the poor standards of 
scholarship  and research in Madrassas today is 
the almost total lack of any collaboration 
between Madrassas and other academic 
institutions, which could have helped Madrassas 
improve their scholarly output. In fact, the 
relationship  between the two sets of institutions 
is characterized by  considerable mutual hostility 
and suspicion. It is also a fact that the wrong 
notion of a divide between ‘religious’ and 
‘worldly’ knowledge that is constantly stressed 
by the Madrassas has played a major role in this 
furthering the division between Madrassas and 
‘secular’ institutions. 
A third factor for this lamentable state of affairs 
is that certain families control the vast majority 
of Madrassas. They have become, in essence, 
family-run affairs. This is the ‘mother of all 
illnesses’, in my humble opinion. It  has resulted 
in the complete absence of democratic 
functioning in the Madrassas, in their 
commercialization and in the exploitation of 
their employees, all of which have had an 
extremely deleterious impact on the Madrassas 
and their scholarly environment. The monopoly 
that certain individuals or families exercise over 
the Madrassas is often reflected in the sort of 
literature that they bring out—much of it being 
pure propaganda, in the form of hagiographies, 
heaping praise on the founders of their 
respective institutions and the ulema associated 
with their sects. 
A fourth factor for the deplorable state of 
scholarship  and research in the Madrassas is 
their extremely restricted syllabus, which has 
made for the ulema to remain confined within 
the four walls of their Madrassas and to have 
little or no knowledge of the rapid changes 
happening in the world around them. This is 
reflected in the sort  of publications that the 
Madrassas and the ulema churn out, many of 
which have no social relevance at all or else 
lack any originality. 
A fifth factor is economic. There are 
undoubtedly many capable students and 
teachers in the Madrassas, who, if given the 
facilities and necessary support, can engage in 
fruitful scholarly research. However, Madrassas 
make no arrangement for financing this sort of 
research work. What generally happens, instead, 
is that some maulvis take to making money and 
winning cheap popularity through penning 
emotionally-driven, and often fiercely  sectarian, 
books of low scholarly standard. They seem to 
enjoy  a mutually beneficial relationship with 
certain publishing houses affiliated with their 
own sects. These publishing houses specialize in 
producing this sort of literature, which rakes in 
handsome profits for their owners as well as for 
those who pen these books. 
A sixth factor for the virtual absence of any 
creative scholarly  work in the Madrassas is that 
very few of them have any special departments 
for research and publications. Most of the few 
Madrassas that do have such departments lack 
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qualified people to staff them. It is very difficult, 
if not impossible, for creative, independent-
minded thinkers and scholars to adjust to the 
closed and insular environment of the Madrassa. 
Seventhly, the fact that the vast majority of 
Madrassa graduates have expertise in just one 
language (Urdu, in north India), with little or no 
familiarity  with English greatly  limits their 
potential as researchers and scholars. Most 
Madrassa graduates do not even know proper 
Arabic despite having spent many years 
ostensibly studying that language. 
What Should Be Done? 
Intellectual work on a large scale cannot depend 
simply  on the efforts and initiative of individual 
scholars. Rather, community-based organizations 
have to create funds and provide facilities to 
encourage scholars. But this is completely 
lacking in the case of the Madrassas. In the past, 
Muslim rulers and nobles generously  patronized 
Madrassa-based scholars. In the West today, huge 
research foundations like the Ford Foundation 
and the Carnegie Foundation provide research 
projects to scholars. Sadly, there are virtually  no 
Muslim organizations that promote this sort of 
work. At least the larger and well-funded 
Madrassas ought to arrange for separate budgets 
for research projects that can be assigned to 
selected scholars to work on. 
Improving the standard of scholarship in the 
Madrassas is inextricably linked to the issue of 
widening their focus so that they see their task 
not simply  as teaching students a set of texts or 
expanding their stock of knowledge but also 
widening their thought and mental horizons. 
Intellectual development can only happen in an 
environment that promotes, rather than 
discourages, curiosity. Sadly, this is totally absent 
in the Madrassas. Further, Madrassas make little 
or no provision for teaching social sciences and 
various languages, without which the sort of 
creative research that one hopes for cannot be 
produced. I think Madrassas must include 
English as a compulsory  subject in their 
curriculum, and, perhaps through open 
universities or the Maulana Azad National Urdu 
University  in Hyderabad, arrange for their 
students to learn various social sciences. In the 
absence of this it  is doubtful if the Madrassas can 
at all engage in any sort of creative and relevant
 research and scholarly work. 
I would also suggest that all big Madrassas set up 
research centers and academies. Some Madrassas 
already have such institutions, but, sadly, most of 
these exist just in name and only for show, 
bringing out literature glorifying their founders or 
fanning sectarian hatred and strife. Madrassas 
must also expand their range of extra-curricular 
activities in order to encourage students to take 
greater interest in research work. They can 
arrange for experts in different subjects (and not 
just those narrowly defined as ‘religious’) to 
deliver regular lectures to their students. They 
can organize regular essay-writing competitions 
and debates for students. They  must also arrange 
for their libraries to stock important journals and 
books, including on contemporary social issues 
and developments. They can provide students 
with training in writing skills and journalism, and 
arrange for selected students’ essays on issues of 
contemporary  concern to be published in 
Madrassa journals or as edited volumes that can 
be made available to the public. Final year 
students must be made to write full-length 
research-based dissertations. This will help 
improve their writing and analytical skills besides
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adding to the scholarly  output of the Madrassas. 
Dissertations of good standard, especially  if they 
represent new and creative thinking, can also be 
published in the form of books so that the 
general public can access them. Bigger 
Madrassas can also encourage scholarly work by 
organizing annual seminars on topics of current 
interest and contemporary import. 
Madrassas can also arrange for their staff and 
senior students to visit other Madrassas, and even 
institutions of learning run by non-Muslims, so 
as to benefit  from them. In this regard some of 
the larger Madrassas can also consider sending 
some of their capable students who are firm in 
their faith to the top  institutions of religious 
learning in the West. These students can play a 
major and vital role in providing scholarly 
responses from an Islamic point of view to 
present-day global challenges. 
These are some suggestions for addressing the 
pathetic state of scholarship that characterizes 
our Madrassas today. In this regard I believe the 
major hurdle that we face is the misplaced sense 
that the Madrassas have of their supposed self-
sufficiency, their reluctance to introspect, their 
feeling that all is right with them and that there is 
no room for improvement at all. Obviously, this 
attitude is hardly conducive to intellectual 
development and the thirst for broadening and 
deepening their intellectual horizons. 
Since the malaise of poor standards of 
scholarship  in the Madrassas is deep-seated and a 
result of many factors, obviously it cannot be 
solved at  once. For this to change, Madrassas 
need to critically  and realistically examine their 
present curriculum and system. Only then can 
they  become centers of scholarly  activity and 
creative thought and research—as were 
Madrassas centuries ago—and in this way prove 
beneficial not just to Muslims alone but to 
humankind in general. Or else, this complaint of 
the poet Muhammad Iqbal will continue to haunt 
them: 
Neither life, nor love. Neither realization, nor 
vision.
Maulana Waris Mazhari, a graduate of the Dar 
ul-Uloom at Deoband, is the editor of the Delhi-
based Tarjuman Dar ul-Uloom, the official organ 
of the Deoband Graduates' Association. He can 
be contacted on w.mazhari@gmail.com
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Shah Mahmoud Hanifi’s lecture on the US 
Foreign Policy and Afghanistan: The Colonial 
Market for Afghan Languages 
by Lindsay N. Meath
Sophomore in Marketing Management at 
Virginia Tech
lmeath@vt.edu 
This lecture was more about the language in 
Afghanistan throughout its history than what I 
thought it would be about, which was the market 
for Afghan languages. There was discussion on 
this fascinating market for a language that 
Americans tend to associate with negative 
thoughts, but  the core of this lecture was on the 
history of Afghan languages and how they lead 
to explain the current market. Professor Shah 
Mahmoud Hanifi from James Madison 
University  started his lecture by  introducing his 
book, “Colonial Market for Afghan Languages”. 
During colonialism 
SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
[18]
in India the British handled some languages well, 
and others not so well, resulting in hundreds of 
neglected and lost languages throughout this period. 
Modern day  Afghanistan was brought into existence 
primarily  because of the British India Colonialism. 
The two primary languages in Afghanistan today 
are Dari and Pashto. The main language that 
Professor Hanifi focused on was Pashto. Pashto is 
associated with the boundary between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and the market for spoken Pashto is 
about $210,000 in a single year. Historically 
Afghanistan has been pulled by the South with the 
Indian Ocean, and the North with the Silk Road. 
When I say “pulled”, this means that the 
geographical North and South locations culturally 
pulled on Afghan society. These “pulls”, natural 
because of Afghan’s location, have affected 
Afghanistan for hundreds of years. This affected 
language because people learned mobility with 
these geographical and cultural pulls. Languages 
ultimately ended up interacting, combining, 
becoming lost, and new ones were created 
throughout the history  of Afghanistan; primarily the 
cause of this is the mobility throughout the region. 
Mobility throughout the region has always made it 
hard to pinpoint identities to certain areas. This may 
lead into a possible foreign policy issue. Since 
historical, cultural, and geographical influences 
have had extreme effects on Afghanistan, the 
different languages are now widespread and have 
dispersed throughout a huge region. Ultimately, 
there is no way for someone to identify a particular 
type of people in a particular section. Which is why 
US foreign policy officials may find this fact 
frustrating in foreign affairs with Afghanistan. The 
effect that mobility has had on Afghan languages is 
a topic that most Americans are not knowledgeable 
about, because the history about these languages is 
not one of particular interest to our society. 
Hanifi then went on to explain more of Pashto, 
and shed light onto the language that so little 
Americans seem to give a second thought about. 
Pashto is primarily a rural language that gets 
trumped by the state bureaucratic language, 
Persian. Persian is a language of bureaucracies 
and government in the entire Middle East region. 
Several theories about where Pashto comes from 
have been brought up, most attributing the 
creation of the language to the influences and 
combinations of other languages. Hanifi 
introduced H.G. Raverty, a very important name 
in the study  of Pashto to this day. Raverty was a 
man who studied Pashto and published 
documents, books, and dictionaries on this 
language. If one were to look up Raverty’s name 
they  would primarily find books that he has 
written about how to learn Pashto. Born in 1825, 
Raverty wasn’t born long after the earliest 
printings of Pashto. The earliest printings of 
Pashto were in the early 1800’s, and today there 
are different types of production used to print 
Pashto. A main use to print  Pashto, present day, 
is for Shab Namaha, or night lettering. These 
documents are generally  threatening and 
combine Pashto and Persia. This introduces the 
most serious interest of foreign policies and 
affairs with Pashto. The US government shows 
this interest in the public market for Pashto. The 
US government has created the DLI, Defense 
Language Institute, for military purposes to study 
the language of Pashto. The DLI is the 
representative of the public market for Pashto. 
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However, the real money making market, with 
the annual income of $210,000, comes from the 
private market of subcontracted work. This 
subcontracted work is usually done for the 
government by highly specialized experts. 
Overall, Hanifi explains in detail how he has 
studied languages in Afghanistan, Pashto being 
the major focus. This language has been 
affected over an extended period of time by 
cultural and geographical influences, and it 
extends into the interest of the US market and 
foreign policy. 
This lecture, even though I did not go into detail 
that US foreign policy plays a role with Pashto, 
was extremely interesting and the US foreign 
policy peaked my interest. The fact that the 
reason there is a market for Pashto today seems 
to come from the interaction between the US 
and Afghanistan. The history of this language is 
so complex and the actual origins are extremely 
difficult to figure out, and even how to print or 
speak it may be difficult for people to 
understand. This shows that language plays a 
vital role in understanding people in a foreign 
place that don’t seem to speak a mainstream 
language. Most militaries are not going to think 
of the complexities of a language when dealing 
with foreign affairs. Primarily they will focus on 
hiring translators and personnel who specialize 
in the particular language in the region. I almost 
wish I could watch military  personnel attempt to 
communicate with people who speak Pashto, 
because this language is not a straightforward 
simple language. Translators and specialists can 
be hired, but what the military and government 
will soon find out is that even those highly 
specialized experts will have a tough time 
translating and interpreting. Pashto is sometimes 
combined with other languages, like in the night 
letters that Afghan groups use. The US 
government and military are aware of this and 
therefore try  to implement ways to help 
specialists learn more, most likely the reason for 
the DLI. My reaction to the night letters was one 
of immediate interest. Groups combine these 
two prominent languages in Afghanistan to 
threaten people across the nation, at least the 
majority  of the time they are threatening. How 
can the US government and military possibly 
figure out the Persian and Pashto combination 
and then figure out where it originates? Even 
with the DLI this is extremely difficult, because 
no one can find true, reliable roots to Pashto. 
Hanifi explained that these letters are printed, 
photocopied, and handwritten, and to have a 
printer of some sort that prints numerous 
amounts of letters written in Pashto seemed to 
confuse Hanifi. This was particularly interesting 
because when a person in the room asked how 
the groups did all this printing, Hanifi, an expert 
it seems at the language in Afghanistan and its 
history, was confused at  how they  could manage 
this with such a complicated language. Now 
Pashto is not only a challenging language with 
its history of the past and cultural influence in 
the region today, but it is also a tremendously 
difficult language to produce on paper. It is 
difficult to produce due to the lettering and 
symbols that the language incorporates, and the 
fact that it is a language of no interest to the 
Afghan government. Also, since the government
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trumps this language and speaks Dari instead, 
they  are not going to spend their time figuring 
out how to find someone truly capable of 
mastering the mass printing process of Pashto. 
Yet, if this mass production of Pashto confuses 
or stumps Hanifi, then surely  the US military 
becomes stumped as well. Pashto is spoken in 
rural areas, but also in threatening letters that 
are of particular interest to our government. 
Pashto, or any other language in Afghanistan for 
that matter, was never of any interest to our 
government, military, or other various people in 
the United States. Now, it appears to me, from 
this lecture, that all of these languages of 
Afghanistan have suddenly become a very 
significant interest to all of the previous people 
listed, because of US foreign policy  concerns 
and the interactions occurring between 
Afghanistan and the United States. Pashto is 
perhaps one of the most complicated hurdles 
that experts, the US government, researchers, 
and the US military  have ever faced culturally 
due to the amount of unknown information that 
all leads back to how this language came about 
in the first place. 
*Shah Mahmoud Hanifi (Assistant Professor, 
B.A. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Ph.D. 
University  of Michigan) teaches courses on the 
history of the modern Middle East and South 
Asia in the History Department and in the 
General Education Program. He is the 
Coordinator of the Interdisciplinary  Minor in 
Middle Eastern Communities and Migrations. 
His recent book titles “Connecting Histories in 
Afghanistan” published by Columbia University 
Press.
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The 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 of 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For some two centuries now many of us have 
imagined global diversity ranging along a 
historically hierarchical trajectory, as though it 
were a sloped, ever-ascending mass movement 
of humanity where cultures, although existing 
side-by-side at the very same moment, could be 
located at  different points of time. By simply 
cruising the world, we could see not only 
humanity’s great cultural diversity but its 
historical as well. It is as though H.G. Wells had 
really invented his time machine allowing us, as 
we travel across the world’s different cultural 
landscape, to visit  places of far-away time. 
Americans can cross their southern border and 
visit their “distant neighbor,” as one book’s title 
advertizes.Or we could visit, as a travel 
promotional brochure claims, Morocco and 
encounter, on camel back, “ancient ruins” and 
an “age-old culture” where “life is much as it 
was centuries ago.” We could, at  this very 
moment, for instance, stand in Manhattan, look 
towards Iran, and declare, because it is ruled by 
Mullahs, that it is “still feudal” and “stuck” in 
the fourteenth-century, with the slightest hint in 
the irony of such a claim. We do, of course, 
realize that Mexico, Morocco, and Iran are all 
here in our very presence. But because of the 
dominance of a linear temporal perspective 
which separates “societies” as containing their 
own space and time, this time-like travel myth 
has now continued for several centuries, and we 
have now become accustomed to see cultures or 
civilizations as possessing their own launching 
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pads with some unable to even ignite their 
engines while others are deep into the way 
yonder. In this sense, our minds have been 
colonized by a nineteenth-century, if not earlier, 
dogma that there exists a linear historical 
progress to which all “societies,” although at 
radically different speeds and at varying points, 
have traveled through. Some may “still” be at  a 
“traditional” or agricultural/rural phase, while 
others are “nearer” to modernity, living in the 
Middle ages or feudal-like societies, but as soon 
as “they” get their true renaissance or religious 
and secular reformers—their equivalents of 
“our” philosophes and Luthers—they too can 
join the more “advanced” societies. 
This book argues that this temporal lens, with its 
peculiar epistemological ways of seeing the 
world of difference, was only slightly revised in 
the hands of the colonized, with much of it 
being accommodated by the political and 
intellectual elites—both secular and Islamists 
alike. While the colonizer constructed this 
historical imagination in their desire to dominate 
the global south, so as to make it appear that 
their rule over the natives was a natural result of 
history’s call for the realization of rationality, 
the Spirit, democracy, the liberation of women, 
or human rights, the colonized scrambled to re-
narrate this very same discourse so as to place 
themselves as the vanguards for the 
emancipation of their societies. By removing the 
colonizers from their midst and replacing them 
with “indigenous” leaders who have the best 
interest of their people in mind, they will be 
well-positioned, so they claimed, to deliver their 
societies—which they admit are “still” in the 
grips of a stagnant mentality—to this glorious 
future.
This is what  I call the colonizer’s temporal 
template, a way of seeing time and the Other 
that will have a tremendous impact on the way 
the colonized, in their attempt to emancipate 
themselves from the colonizer, understood 
social change and progress, leading them to 
think that the only way they could join 
modernity is through massive cultural, political, 
and technological overhaul of their societies. In 
this book we will compare three different kinds 
of responses to this colonizer’s gaze in the 
Middle East, in which the colonizer’s time of 
the Other was strategically  revised in a number 
of ways, yet remaining loyal to it as well. 
Kemalism and Zionism, in their efforts to push 
“their people” forward in time accepted the 
narrative almost wholeheartedly, and proceeded 
to eradicate what they perceived as “archaic” 
characteristics of their Jewish and Turkish 
cultures, while Arab Nationalists, in a similar 
desire to get  their people to “catch up” to the 
West, negotiated a more cultural schizophrenic 
approach on how to appease the colonizer’s 
gaze. But so too, as the book investigates, did 
the Islamists, who likewise wanted to improve 
their societies, but in order to move forward in 
time they prescribed the eradication of Western 
contamination and reintroduced the prophetic 
stage that  they believe, if it weren’t corrupted 
and just had been left alone and remained true to 
itself—and if the colonizer and their local Arab 
co-conspirators didn’t intervene with their toxic 
mora l i ty—would have p roduced t rue 
civilization. In this since they all shared the 
same episteme that the colonizer delivered to 
the region in the nineteenth century. The 
colonizers insistence on essentializing their 
difference between themselves and the Other 
was based on a temporalized script, a script 
whose intention was to distantiate the the Arab 
SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
[22]
and Muslim spatially and temporally  from their 
Western self. Colonial difference, therefore, 
legitimized the subordination of the global south 
to colonial rule by positing the colonized—
sometimes in a biological and at  other times in a 
cultural evolutionary  framework—as too 
immature for self rule. Representing the Other 
as living in tents, herding goats, riding camels, 
and living in a nomadic and Bedouin 
“premodern” lifestyle was part and parcel of 
placing the Arab into a time narrative that made 
him or her appear as belonging to an earlier Age 
of Man. Of course, some of these constructs 
were of a romantic sort, where Western 
Orientalists, feeling entrapped in an ugly 
industrialized urban zones of polluted areas like 
that of late 19th century Manchester England, 
dreamt of the “noble savage” who lived free and 
in the wild. Yet no matter what the intentions 
were, romantic or strictly  utilitarian in nature, 
the effect in either case created a temporal trope 
around which the Arab’s culture and civilization 
were understood. Moreover, the effects were 
exceptionally  productive in that by positing this 
difference the colonized would likewise insist 
on maintaining this script, but only after 
removing the colonizer and replacing him with 
the modern (male) nationalist  who himself has 
matured from his child-like Bedouin past. 
The perceived backwardness of the Muslim 
people when compared to the West, mixed with 
the feeling of being humiliated by  an occupying 
foreign force, made it all that more necessary to 
claim a sphere which they could use to inspire 
their scarred dignity. This book, in its theoretical 
contribution to the literature on nationalist  and 
Islamist movements in the Middle East, follows 
the lead of Partha Chatterjee’s analysis of Indian 
nationalism. But while Chatterjee’s creative 
scholarly intervention was not all that useful in 
analyzing Kemalism and Zionism, his work 
proved to be highly applicable to Arab 
nationalism. Given the fact that Arab 
nationalists were deeply in awe with the culture 
and power of the West, they devised a way to 
reproduce the colonizer’s cultural and temporal 
script by  acknowledging the latter’s scientific 
and technological superiority, and proceeded to 
emulate those things that they  understood as 
universal items of modernity, things like 
statecraft, economy, and science. However, 
emulating this exterior material domain 
produced in them a desire to create a spiritual 
interior domain that they  could call all their 
own, a unique and distinct Arab personality. But 
as we discover in this book, this interior domain, 
which they identified as their true personality, 
required quite a bit of invention, of which their 
colonial predecessors had already  unearthed and 
manufactured generations earlier. The irony of 
this is that the most creative aspect of such 
nationalism, whose intention is “to fashion a 
‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless 
not Western,” was in fact first launched by the 
colonizers. It was the latter who created a 
discourse of colonial difference so as to mark, 
both culturally and racially, the Other as 
temporally and spatially distant, creating in 
effect a narrative script which Arab nationalist 
would only slightly revise.  
Notice that in all the cases above the movements 
worked within the given constraints provided to 
them by the colonizer’s gaze to force the Other 
into a faraway time and place.  Indeed, the 
method these movements used to assert their 
own identity had already been narrated long 
before the appearance of any of these 
movements. What Occidentalizers like Herzl, 
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Ataturk, and Islamists like Qutb, Khomenei, 
and bin Laden did was simply to take the 
constructions provided by  the Orientalist 
system and tugged on one or the other side, 
recreating the images of what they  now 
understood as their authentic self. The only 
difference is which side of the rope they 
tugged on. For Herzl and Ataturk they  used 
every  muscle in their body  to tug their 
“nation” out of the Orient while for the 
Islamists, with the help of the Almighty, 
everything possible was done to pull the 
Umma back towards Medina and Mecca—
one side desiring to remove the Orient while 
the other cleansing Islam from the toxins of 
the Occident. The cultural schizophrenia of 
the Arab nationalists stood in the middle and 
was unsure which side of the rope to pull on, 
but it knew, deep down, that it must in order 
to “improve” its subjects. Yet, in all three 
cases “the West,” in some mysterious way, 
remained solidly in place. As Leila Ahmed 
has persuasively argued, even the most 
radical sounding narratives never seem to 
break free from the Orientalist categories to 
which they  are responding. Rather, they tend 
to “appropriate, in order to negate, the 
symbolic terms of the original narrative. 
Standing in relation of antithesis to thesis, 
the resistance narrative thus reverse—but 
thereby also accept—the terms set in the first 
place by the colonizers.” 
The book will end with the search for what I 
call “Post-Orientalist” movements. There are 
now emerging individuals and movements 
that see the limits of working within the 
world that the colonizer taught us to inhabit 
and are looking for ways to articulate a self 
that allows our collective egos to dissipate a 
bit and become calmed by  the actual 
interconnected space and time of Self and 
Other. This book will end by  briefly 
exploring some intellectuals who are turning 
away from the colonizer’s temporal template 
so as to live in a world not determined by  a 
standard of measurement that is highly 
judgmental and insulting, but  inhabited by  a 
compassionate Being that allows all of us to 
live free of the tools of an obsessed 
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